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CONSERVATISM: AN EXPLANATION OF THE FINANCIAL CHOICES 
OF THE SMALL AND MEDIUM FAMILY ENTERPRISE 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The financial behavior of the family firm is a recurring topic in the literature. Hirigoyen’s 
pioneer research (1984) reveals the specificity of the financial behaviors of industrial family 
medium-sized companies1 compared to those of the other categories of firms. This type of firms  
set out effective structures enabling them a better financial management because, on the one hand, 
they have a long term vision and, on the other hand, are not accountable for short-term results 
(Dreux, 1990), especially for unquoted firms. In addition, the desire to transmit the firm to the 
next generations would more encourage the effective management of capital (Gallo and Vilaseca, 
1996). Precisely, the long-term horizons of the family firm make it possible to qualify its capital 
as “patient financial capital” (Reynolds, 1992). Indeed, this capital is invested for long periods 
without threat of liquidation contrary to “ordinary” financial capital which generally have a due 
limit corresponding to the end of investment (Dobrzynski, 1993). The firms having this type of 
capital would be able to pursue more creative and innovating strategies.  
Besides, family firms, of small and medium size especially, are characterized by the lack 
of financial resources. Ward (1987) observes that poverty in capital which is necessary to finance 
the needs of the family and the business is a factor which inhibits growth. Two explanations 
justify the lack of financial resources in SME. The first makes responsible the financial markets. 
Indeed, investors would be very hesitant as for investing in these firms (Mahérault and Lyagoubi, 
2002). Many family firms SME are not able to meet the necessary conditions, or sometimes 
unwilling to set up the adequate organizational answers, to facilitate their access to the external 
capital (Davis and ali., 2000). The second explanation is about internal obstacles. To achieve its 
goal of durability, the family firm tries to evolve in a more or less hermetic universe. Accordingly, 
external financial intervention is avoided because it can deteriorate the independence of the firm.  
The small and medium family enterprise is characterized by a strong conservative attitude. 
How does conservative orientation influence the financial choices of the small and medium 
family enterprise? This theoretical contribution tries to answer this question. For Kreiser and ali. 
(2002), the family firm in general adopts a strategy of a conservative growth dedicating the 
“living company” model. Such a company consecrates long-term survival instead of financial 
performance as the main objective to be pursued. Accordingly, highly aware of its identity, it 
privileges financial conservatism and maintains a narrow control on strategic decisions in family 
hands. The analyzes of Hirigoyen (1985) join this idea since the author emphasizes that the 
industrial family SME does not furnish a true effort to increase its market share because it is 
mainly preoccupied by controlled growth. 
The analysis will be done in two steps. After pointing out the main dimensions of the 
financial conservatism of family SME: internal financing and avoidance of the external financial 
involvement, the analysis will explain the manifestations of conservatism and its sources. The 
paper will be concluded by reflections as for the strategies enabling to avoid, limit or even 
eliminate the impacts of conservatism. 
                                                           
1
 The recurring problem of the family firm definition will not be tackled. On this question, see: Allouche and 
Aman (2000). 
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1. Independence orientation and financial choices 
 
Family SME seeks to be financially independent. The theory of resource dependency 
provides an explanation to this attitude: the higher the dependence on capital is, the more the 
potential financier would dispose of an increased influence in the decision-making within the firm 
(Davis and ali., 2000). As the requested resources are lower than the available resources, the 
suppliers have the right to exert a considerable control on those which require the supply (Pfeffer 
and Salancick, 1978). From the agency theory point of view, external financing in family SME, 
even if it does not involve agency problems between owner and managers may draw its specific 
batch of agency problems with outsider financier (banks and minority shareholders). Thus 
conflicts can occur as the outsiders’ objectives relating to the control of organizational 
performance and, for the financial ones in particular, to the liquidity, payback and the debt 
interest, would be opposed to those of the insiders pursuing growth, value creation, and 
profitability or growing returns for the shareholder (Davis and ali., 2000). These antagonisms are 
exacerbated because of information asymmetry which could develop, on the one hand, between 
the owner (as a borrower) and the bankers and, on the other hand, between the owner (as an issuer 
of shares) and the purchasers of these shares. 
Ultimately, the family firm appears to be resistant to the adoption of financing modes 
other than internal ones. Conservative and independent, it seems strongly predisposed to 
implement or at least to adhere to the recommendations of the theory of hierarchical financing. 
The assumption of pecking order theory was developed by Myers and Majluf (1984). In addition, 
its origins go back to Donaldson (1961) who observed that firms usually abstain from issuing 
shares and borrow only if the investment requires more funds than the existing cash-flows. 
Accordingly, there would be an order of adoption of financing modes: internal financing, long-
term loans and finally issue of equity. In their empirical study, Belletante and Paranque (1998) 
corroborate this thesis when observing that the management of quoted SMEs expresses a real 
reserve to practice capital increase thus translating a hierarchy in their financing preferences. 
The research carried out by these authors shows that the call for capital stocks is the last 
solution considered by  management of quoted SMEs (even if they could chose it more easily 
than the management of unquoted SME), although they believe that this resource is less 
expensive than debt (Belletante and Paranque, 1998). Particularly to the family firm, Khan 
(2000) observes that this entity, when obliged to make evolve its financial structure, should adopt 
a path formed by three phases of financing: Initially, during the first phases of growth, internal 
financing is privileged (1.1), then a first external phase through debt is considered (1.2.1) and 
finally a second external phase, through financial markets or opening of capital could be 
envisaged (1.2.2). 
 
 
1.1. Internal financing: privileged source of financing 
 
“The cash flow is the first accounting line which I look at, well before the benefit”, 
declares Michel Haag, chairman of Météor, a French family firm. His father and uncle voluntarily 
pursued the same policy by limiting the distributed benefit. Accordingly, the firm invested each 
year 12% of its sales turnover while having a minimum recourse to debt. In general, the family 
firm favors internal financing of its activities by the retention of profits and the constitution of 
reserves. In addition, since the indebtedness is not always easy because of the mistrust of banks 
with regard to small and medium firms, most of the time it would be simpler to be self-financed. 
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Internal financing is a process which consists in financing the needs by means of resources 
drawn from the firm’s activity. Thus, it enables to avoid the recourse to external funds. Two 
benefits are required. On the one hand, the risk of the firm does not increase contrary to debt. In 
addition, the firm prevents from creating conflicts of interests between shareholder (owner) and 
creditor. Moreover, contrary to the issue of equity, internal financing is not accompanied by a 
dilution effect. Finally, it has the advantage of avoiding revealing information, relating for 
example to future projects and investments, to investors in case of external financing.  
The family firm which decides to internally finance its needs would make it at the expense 
of other financial decisions. There is an opposed relation between internal financing and 
distribution of dividends. Hirigoyen (1982, 1984) observes that the majority of unquoted family 
firms do not distribute dividends. Likewise, the results obtained by Calvi-Reveyron (2000) show 
that family firms are less generous than other categories of firms as for the distribution of 
dividends2. Thus, the percentage of capital held by management seems to have a negative impact 
on the rate of distribution (Calvi-Reveyron, 2000). Indeed, a generous dividend policy limits, all 
things being equal, internal financing and then intensifies the need for recourse to financial 
markets for the realization of investments (Easterbrook, 1984). In addition, it increases the 
financial risk of the firm (Calvi-Reveyron, 2000) and limits the free cash-flows3 available to the 
management.  In sum, the family firm is able to draw on its incomes in order to constitute internal 
financing. Therefore, Jenster and Malone (1991) observe that many of these firms hold abundant 
liquidities which do not necessarily find relevant uses. 
However, the internal constitution of financial funds is not always easy. Indeed, some 
family firm’s specific events could involve a consumption of its financial resources. The financing 
of succession planning, retirement or other personal projects can push the owners to quickly 
harvest the “fruits” of the activity rather than to reinvest them (Ward, 1988). Galbraith (2003) 
observes, for example, that a particular event like divorce or separation would draw a decrease of 
short-term financial performance which suggests that a consumption of financial resources occurs. 
Sometimes also, it is necessary to satisfy the shareholders’ major requirement which is 
distribution of dividends or generally funds to family members. Ward (1988) underlines, 
nevertheless, that a good growth of the business may sometimes not satisfy the economic needs of 
a family growing in size and standards of living. 
 
1.2. External financing 
 
Family SME is reticent to open up financially to outside. The pecking order theory 
suggests that between debt and equity issue, the firm primarily chooses the first method, because 
its cost, i.e. interest, would be generally lower than probable dividends to be distributed. We will 
discuss the position of family SME with respect to debt and opening of capital. 
 
1.2.1. Debt 
 
Family SME avoids external financing and debt, in particular. Schulze and Dino (1998) 
observe that approximately a third of American family firms affirm not to have debt and that the 
                                                           
2 Currently, in France the direction of this relation seems to be reversed since the family firms are tending to 
distribute more dividends because of the ISF (French Tax on Wealth). 
3 Free Cash-Flows are the cash-flows in excess after the distribution of the funds necessary to projects having a 
positive net present value with a correct cost of capital. JENSEN (1986) recommends distributing the free cash-
flows to shareholders in order to reduce the resources controlled by managers and thus their power. Indeed, the 
disadvantage of such a situation would be that management escapes from market control by carrying out non-
profitable investments. 
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2/3 asserts to have a “debt/ equity” ratio lower than 25%. A more recent study shows that, on 
average, family firms have not less debt than nonfamily firms (Hagelin and ali., 2006). However, 
owners with high “voting rights/capital” ratio are associated with firms with less debt (Hagelin 
and ali., 2006). For Minton and Wruck (2001), many firms adopt a conservative financial policy 
implying less debt than dominant financial theories predict. These firms hold a lot of available 
funds as well as a balanced treasury which enable them to finance their expenditures in an internal 
way. Thus, by relying on costly internal capital, there would be a negative impact on growth and 
financial performance because those firms do not benefit from debt leverage effect. Besides, for 
Schulze and ali. (2003), the behavior of owner-managers with respect to debt depends on the 
market state. They would be more favorable to debt in periods of market growth than in periods of 
stagnation. Moreover, Minton and Wruck (2001) observe that financial conservatism is 
temporary. Indeed, 70% of the firms they observed change posture as for debt and 50% do it in 
the five years. Theoretically, Schulze and ali. (2003) believe that altruism and family firm specific 
relationships can render owners more disposed to be involved in debt and to assume risk that debt 
may entail as for their individual wealth (Schulze and ali., 2003). 
 
1.2.2. Opening of capital 
 
 The opening of capital has other specificities. Quotation, for example, could involve a 
major change of the ownership structure and thus the firm’s governance because of the entry of 
external shareholders. Davis and ali. (2000) explain that the family firms are obliged to share 
governance responsibilities in order to facilitate the acquisition of critical resources while 
remaining sensitive to the expectations of family members. The influence of outsiders, within the 
board of directors, for example, would be more intense as the need for an external financing and 
an access to the money markets increases. For Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003), a sale of shareholders' 
equity by initial public offerings involves a second consequence: because of the importance of the 
initial returns, it causes a wealth transfer from the current owners to the new shareholders. 
The opening of capital, and to the extreme the dependence4, worry the family firms 
because it is likely to create an agency relation between at least two unequal poles of shareholders 
of different nature (Adam-Ledunois and Vigoureux, 1998). In opposition to the process of 
opening of the firm by an engagement in a cooperation relation, which can affect only one 
activity or a function of the firm, the dependence of the family firm has a more global direct 
effect which limits the firm’s independence as for the whole strategic decisions (Adam-
Ledunois and Vigoureux, 1998). Indeed, the capacity and the willingness of the external entity 
to direct the strategic decisions would involve an attenuation of firm’s independence. Generally, 
the minority shareholder in a medium-sized company is not regarded like a simple holder of a 
receivable amount indexed on the firm’s prosperity and does not agree to give up completely the 
main prerogatives of his voting rights at the profit of the majority (Adam-Ledunois and 
Vigoureux, 1998). Two reasons explain this position. First of all, because the supplier of external 
capital (the principal) would hardly control the majority’s actions (assimilated to the manager: the 
agent) due to weak information transparency (e.g. non-quotation of the firm, absence of a market 
of managers), agency costs would be important. Thus, the need for controlling as well as possible 
these costs, in situation of opening of capital, constitutes an explanatory factor of the necessary 
implication of the external entity in the decision-making process of medium-sized companies. The 
second reason is that none non-controlling associate in medium-sized companies can do without a 
minimal implication because of the weak liquidity of its investment (when there is no quotation). 
                                                           
4
 A firm becomes dependent if its equity is controlled by a coalition of persons (e.g. a family) together with 
minority shareholders such as financial institutions, banks, or venture capitalists. 
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Risk aversion, search of durability and the will of preservation and transmission of the 
family heritage underlie the logic of financial independence. Overall, a “state of mind” hostile to 
change is likely to be disseminated within the organization: conservatism. 
 
2. Conservatism: a dominating context 
 
Conservatism is the attachment to the choices of past (Timur, 1988). The literature treating 
about political conservatism5 speaks about ex post conservatism consisting in a high prudence as 
for the choices preferred and carried out by a group, and about ex ante conservatism consisting in 
an aversion testing new ideas (Dearden, Ickes and Samuelson, 1990).  
For the literature about cultural identities, conservatism is a cultural dimension related to 
the look which societies have on the individual as an autonomous entity or as a member a social 
group. This cultural character would be present in societies dedicating the values of harmony and 
convenience in relations/groups (Johnson and Lenartowicz, 19986). Values such as moderation, 
social order, security, tradition and reciprocity of favors are crucial in conservative societies. The 
maintenance of the status quo and also of the harmonious relations not only within the group, but 
also within society is crucial. Schwartz (1994) identifies three components of conservatism as a 
collective cultural dimension: 
- harmonious working relationships and a social harmony: this characteristic implies, inter 
alia, the dedication of the group interest at the expense of individual’s even if the group decisions 
go against what the individuals prefer. 
- safeguarding of public image: this image is likely to be ruined when the individuals do 
not manage carrying out what is expected from them. Some managers try to preserve their image 
and thus act in a conservative way.  
- security, conformism and tradition: this implies a propensity to devote an autocratic and 
paternalist style of management (Chui and ali. 2002) which can be reflected, for example, in the 
firm financing choices. 
 
The impact of conservatism is observed and exerted on the level of firm’s governance 
bodies (2.1), mainly the manager and the board of directors. Even if the family logic and the 
owner-family’s expectations can explain conservative behavior, other explanations are found in 
past performance and in the founder’s age. Often, succession constitutes a crucial opportunity to 
break free from organizational conservatism (2.2). 
 
2.1. The firm’s governance: resistance to change  
 
Which effects does conservatism have on the governance of family SME?  
Conservative organizations and particularly family firms are characterized by the 
persistence and substantial power of old generations who exert a strong supervision on the owner-
manager. Thus, conservative firms would have a risk-averse, a not-innovating, passive and 
reactive style of management (Covin, 1991). Generally, conservatism is associated with the 
owner-manager (founder) (2.1.1). Indeed, his role in the strategic orientation adopted by the firm 
                                                           
5
 Derived from the Latin term conservare and applied to identify the political movements and intellectuals whose 
purpose is the preservation of social order and the re-establishment of a former order founded in their eyes on 
natural laws or transcendent data.  
6
 Cited by A. Chui and ali. (2002). 
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is of primary importance. In addition, board of directors7 exhibits a lack of effectiveness and does 
not fully play his role (2.2.2). 
 
2.1.1. The owner-manager 
 
The owner-manager of the family firm plays an important role in the strategic posture of 
his firm. The cultural configuration of the family and the role it gives to the founder explain its 
disposition to change (Jenster and Malone, 1991). Indeed, when it is patriarchal, i.e. highly 
depending on its founder, the organization would be less inclined to change and to challenging 
values and family relations (Moloktos, 1991). A patriarchal family controlling a paternalist 
organization is the ultimate case of figure (Jenster and Malone, 1991): being dependent to a high 
degree on its founder, the organization would be unable to promote change as it is not instigated 
by the founder. However, the founder or owner-manager may be unwilling to promote change. 
Hambrick, Geletkanycz and Fredrickson (1993) call this tendency to slow down the change 
“commitment to the status quo” (CSQ). The management believes in the permanent accuracy of 
current strategies or organizational behaviors (Hambrick et al., 1993). Thus, this type of owner-
manager even in fact perceives only one weak need for adjustment of critical changes in the 
external environment.  
A first explanation of the stagnancy of the family firm’s owner-manager is psychological. 
Indeed, the founder depends on his firm in order to be defined and to assert himself. The firm is 
emotionally charged (Moloktos, 1991). In addition, it seems that owner-manager’s conservatism 
would be stronger as his psychological dependence on his deceased or retired father was high 
(Miller and &li., 2003). Besides, family firms’ founders tend to be identified with their own vision 
of the organization, an inevitably subjective if not erroneous vision. They conceive the 
organization as an extension of their own identities, and try to maintain, sometimes within 
nonreasonable limits, an adequacy between the organization and their personal identity. In this 
sense, Ranft and O' Neill (2001) explain that the desire to maintain the organization in the 
founder’s personally-preferred state constitute a demonstration of a narcissistic behavior and 
Hubris8. The consequence of these observations is that the strong personal implication and the 
commitment become obstacles to opening up and search of change. This individual’s attachment 
to the organization should increase with age. The founder tends to privilege security by avoiding 
the use of resources to increase growth and therefore causing the stagnation of the business. As he 
becomes aged, the founder becomes increasingly conservative and risk-averse. 
Besides, the owner-manager’s conservatism is explained by his neglect of entrepreneurial 
initiative. For Jenster and Malone (1991), the family firm’s founder is likely to reach a state of 
plateauing manifested by a situation of stagnancy which has negative impacts on the firm. He is 
not aggressive and proactive any more but rests on his laurels. He is less involved in the firm but 
more in other social activities. Ranft and O' Neill (2001) observe that founders who were 
successful in the development of their firms see their managerial responsibilities pushing around 
and limiting their entrepreneurial responsibilities as the firm grows or opens to more owners. 
From now on, the needs of business management consume more the time and attention of the 
founder who will devote less time to creative activities such as research and development. 
Ultimately, the “mixture” of managerial activity and entrepreneurial activity leads to a reduction 
of the latter. Accordingly, Rubenson and Gupta (1991) recommend that the style of management 
must change as the firm evolves. Concretely, the founder’s attitude must evolve from passionate 
commitment to non passionate objectivity. The neglect of entrepreneurial initiative is all the more 
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 For the firms which adopt one. 
8
 The hybris is a Greek concept which can be translated by “excessiveness”. It is a violent feeling inspired by 
passions and more particularly, by pride. 
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serious as the firm lives a delegation crisis and an absence of decentralization to children for 
example. The owner-manager will be unable or unwilling to give up his prerogatives of control 
but maintains responsibilities and authority in his own hands. As a consequence, the rigidity of the 
firm will increase. 
 
2.1.2. The board of directors 
 
The board of directors is strategic source of initiative and relevant information and also 
source of expertise, consulting and control since it must also correct the trajectory in case of 
deviating management. Schematically, it achieves two missions: a mission of control and a 
mission of service. According to agency theory, control relates to the appointment, remuneration, 
discipline and dismissal of management. It is also about adopting the initiatives suggested by the 
latter and evaluating their performance (Johnson and ali., 1996). The task of service includes the 
activities intended to improve the reputation and competitiveness of the firm: it is about 
consulting given to management, establishment of links with the outside and representation of the 
firm within the community. 
However, its role within family SME needs to be moderated. Mustakallio and Autio 
(2001) argue that the role of the board of directors, measured by its composition and by the 
intensity of the control it exerts, would be more significant as the implication of the family 
members in the management decreases - suggesting at the opposite that the more the family is 
involved, the less decisive the role of the board would be. In general, the traditional family firm is 
known to have a board of directors whose members, selected according to their status and 
influence within the family and not according to their knowledge of the activity or industry, 
occupy their positions for long periods and have insufficient or inadequate professional 
competences. According to this description, they constitute a barrier to any attempt of change 
which potentially threats the stability of the firm. Ranft and O'Neill (2001), notice that the 
founders of high-performing firms are even tempted to weaken deliberately the board of directors 
of their firms in order to maintain the status quo. The inward orientation is more corroborated in 
some family firms who simply do not implement such a body (Melin and Nordqvist, 2000). 
 
 
2.2. The family: source or remedy against conservatism? 
 
According to the analysis of Harris and ali. (1994), the family firm exhibits some rigidity 
when a change of paradigm is necessary. These rigidities are due to the fact that: 
- It privileges internal succession, which is one of its objectives, and dedicates loyalty, 
whereas new paradigms are more likely to originate from external employees or management; 
- The in-house trained successors have a weak external experience whereas new 
paradigms can be formed on the basis of the variety of personal experiences; 
- The heir of the entrepreneur could suffer from a lack of self-confidence whereas the 
possibility of emergence of new paradigms generally requires a great confidence in its own 
judgment. 
Insofar, does the family constitute the single source of organizational conservatism? 
 
2.2.1. Conservatism and its multiple origins 
 
What are the explanations of the conservative attitude adopted by the family firm? First of 
all, the interaction between the family and business systems is the central element which prevents 
the firm from quickly adapting to new conditions (Moloktos, 1991). For Moloktos (1991), when 
9 
 
the life cycles of these two systems do not evolve at the same pace, risks of crisis would be 
important. Because of their interdependence, transition and change are issues to be managed all at 
the same time by the firm and the family. An illustration of this life cycle non-parallelism could 
be seen in the passage from the entrepreneurial phase to the administrative phase (Ward, 1987). 
Indeed, this transition is generally accompanied by a family resistance to change and to 
accompany the necessary development of the firm. Mustakallio and Autio (2002) advance other 
reasons influencing family firm’s entrepreneurial orientation. First of all, the strategic and 
operational decision-making processes are often not separated, because the owner-family 
furnishes at the same time one or more directors and one or more operational managers. The 
influence exerted by operational decision-making on strategic decision-making combined with the 
fact that these processes are not explicit would lead to the avoidance of strategic initiative 
(Mustakallio and Autio, 2002). 
In addition, potential conflicts between family members stick on the firm. Thus, the family 
quarrels can constitute a barrier to the implementation of development plans and then reduce the 
capacity of the firm to adopt a proactive posture. Moreover, because of the investment of the 
totality of its wealth in the firm, the family will tend to avoid risk taking. Another explanation of 
conservatism is about the weak liquidity of the firms’ stocks which, in consequence, exempt it 
from external control of strategies (Mustakallio and Autio, 2002). In addition, because it is 
difficult to determine the right price of these stocks and to integrate the prospects for future 
growth into this price, the firm is not interested by its growth and that of the future benefits but 
rather by the increase in its balance-sheet value (Mustakallio and Autio, 2002). 
The former performance plays also an important role in shaping the conservative behavior 
of the firm. Indeed, various studies observe that the success of the firm creates personal and 
organizational forces manifested by a certain form of arrogance as for competitive pressures 
(Ranft and O' Neill, 2001). Personal paradigms which by the past proved their efficacy constitute 
inhibitors to change. Thus, in spite of the evolution of the environment and performance 
requirements, the owner-manager could become inflexible and rigid by promoting practices and 
strategies resulting from past successes and avoiding decisions which can threaten his image or 
his economic wealth (Ward, 1997). Consequently, he perceives a weak need for adjustment even 
in case of critical changes in the external environment. The sociologists speak about an 
impregnation process which occurs during the first stages of existence of the organization. The 
members of the firm create and learn various routines contributing to firm’s performance. 
However, during time these routines are transformed into habits which in their turn become 
traditions tending to preserve the initial conditions of success (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991). In 
addition, a high performance coupled with the firm’s age and the duration of founder’s activity 
would exacerbate the forces leading to impregnation and traditionalism. For Mustakallio and 
Autio (2002), organizations lose their entrepreneurial orientation as they become aged. The more 
the firm is aged the more it tends to exploit its initial specific advantages. Moreover, the more it 
learns how to exploit its initial advantage, the less it will be inclined to explore new advantages. 
Thus, firms having made successfu breakthroughs tend more to privilege exploitation for longer 
periods and are characterized by a greater inertia (Levinthal and March, 1993). In sum, giving a 
high importance to traditions and emotionally attached to the firm and stability of ownership, the 
family firm shows a greater reduction of its innovativity and proactivity than other firms. 
In short, family SME exhibits a high strategic conservatism when the strategy hitherto 
adopted showed its effectiveness. The feeling of stability and acquired profitability constitute a 
barrier in front of the willingness to discover new outlets for firms’ products. A strategy which 
functions or which functioned well in the past has all the chances to be set up as the firm’s 
strategic paradigm. Therefore, the management is reticent to seek other performance paths and 
prefers to stick to the strategy which proved reliable in the past (Jenster and Malone, 1991).  
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A characteristic of family SME is that it is prone to succession which can take place 
within the family circle. Since founder’s and family’s attitudes, paradigms and schemas could not 
be (or hardly) amended, succession constitutes the major opportunity to release the organization 
from conservatism. 
 
2.2.2. Succession: a solution to conservatism 
 
The firm’s controlling generation is a variable exerting a strong influence on governance 
and the strategy of the family firm. In spite of the risk which the succession could provoke on the 
firm since it can imply the fragmentation of control and ownership and the reduction of size if the 
firm is divided into separate entities (Yeung, 2000), succession would have beneficial effects as 
for the strategic orientation. Miller and ali. (2003) identify three types of succession for the family 
firm: The succession can be conservative, hesitant or rebel. In this last configuration, the general 
strategy should undergo great changes which touch the extent of product/market portfolio and 
functional marketing strategies (Miller and ali., 2003). Jenster and Malone (1991) confirm the 
correlation between succession and change since the adoption of change depends above all on 
firm’s leadership: Indeed, organizational transitions would have more chance to be carried out if a 
leadership change occurs through firm’s transfer from the founder to the successors. The new 
owner-manager can choose acquisitions, investment withdrawals, expansions, changes of product 
or market and changes of firm’s general policy. However, it is possible that changes induced by 
this transmission will not be founded on a real will to seize new opportunities but rather by the 
desire of the successor to leave his own print and to flee the past. Indeed, it seems that a rebel 
succession is more likely to occur when there is a conflict between father and son (Miller and ali., 
2003). In this case, the new owner-manager rejects the legacy of the former generation and the 
detachment from past and its practices is total.  
It is undeniable that the competence of the successor and his leadership qualities constitute 
necessary conditions to the success of the strategic revival. In this vein, Ward (1987) stresses that 
if successor’s qualities of leadership are weak and its competences limited then the future growth 
of the family firm would be inhibited (Ward, 1987). For this author, the weak leadership is 
explained by security and inherited wealth which would deprive younger generations of the 
desire, the need and the eagerness required to be good entrepreneurs and thus to be able to assume 
the management responsibilities. If competence is absent or insufficient, strong leadership can 
thus be followed by periods of conservative strategies and organizational behavior. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes how organizational’s conservatism impacts the financial choices of 
family SME. Through family SME main governance bodies i.e. the owner-manager and board of 
directors, conservatism influences decision-making and particularly financial decisions and 
choices. 
 The successful and sustainable family firm has to renew its business strategy several 
times as the market and competitive pressures evolve (Ward, 1988). However, the literature 
suggests that the family system attempts to create and maintain a cohesiveness that supports the 
family "paradigm" which is described as the core assumptions, beliefs, and convictions that the 
family holds in relation to its environment (Gudmundson and ali., 1999). Information that is not 
11 
 
consistent with this paradigm is resisted or ignored (Davis, 1983). The more the family is 
conservative the less it works for change.  
For this reason, Harris and ali. (1994) suggest that the family firm must carry out some 
critical tasks to strategy development: Reinterpreting the role of the entrepreneurial hero (the 
founder); challenging old strategic paradigms and promoting strategic development as process of 
continuous change. 
The succession is an event which is favorable to change. Other favorable actions deserve 
to be mentioned. Thus, the revitalization of the board of directors may permit to struggle against 
conservative “temptations”. In particular, outside directors’ contribution would be valuable. This 
role can be emphasized through the two missions they must achieve: control and consulting. For 
the first, it is known that outside directors would be more independent and able to defend the 
shareholders’ interests. As for the second, outsiders would prevent from the dominance of a single 
line of thought by challenging the assumptions underlying the firm’s strategies and injecting 
external knowledge. Empirically, research indicates that boards with high proportion of external 
directors are more intensely involved in strategic decision-making (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992), 
are ready to analyze the firm’s forces and weaknesses and act as a change catalyst (Muelle, 
19889).  
Under the assumption of attenuated conservatism, Corbetta and Montemerlo (1995) stress 
that, in order to receive external financing, family SME must exhibit solid and transparent 
financial and patrimonial structures. Accordingly, the firm must choose the “rich firm – poor 
family” model at the expense of the “poor firm – rich family” one. Actually, this latter implies that 
the family regularly withdraws money from the firm and reinvests it privately thus causing an 
over-estimation of debt and an inaccurate image of firm’s finance. Besides, Yeung (2002) 
recommends to the family firm seeking financing on the money market to conform to overall 
governance, banking and accounting standards. In sum, it is necessary to set up adequate 
organizational responses to the requests and expectations of financial parties in order to increase 
the legitimacy of the firm and permit access to capital. 
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